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ARTICLES
STILL  CONFRONTING  THE  CONSOLIDATION
CONUNDRUM
Richard Marcus*
“I think it unlikely that the class action will ever be taught to behave
in accordance with the precepts of the traditional model of
adjudication.”
—Professor Abram Chayes (1976)1
“Class actions had their day in the sun and kind of petered out.”
—Dean Paul Carrington,
Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (1988)2
“[The use of class actions is] transforming the litigation land-
scape. . . . Class actions are being certified at unprecedented rates,
and they are involving a substantial [number], if not a majority, of
all American citizens.”
—Judge Paul Niemeyer,
Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (1997)3
 2012 Richard Marcus.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Horace Coil Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.  Since 1996, I have served as Associate Reporter of the U.S. Judicial
Conference’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  Some of that work has focused on
class actions.  In this piece, however, I speak only for myself and not for the
Committee or anyone else.  I am indebted to Mary Kay Kane for a multitude of very
helpful suggestions about a draft of this article; remaining errors are mine alone.
1 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1291 (1976).
2 Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1988, at B7 (quoting Carrington).
3 Senate Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Class Action Litigation Reform, 66 U.S.L.W.
2294 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1997).
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“Anyone listening to our opening statements [about class-action liti-
gation] would think that we are talking about two different things.
The wide differences of the views are astounding, but they happen
regularly in the Judiciary Committee.”
—Rep. John Conyers (2012)4
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, I reacted to then-current debates about handling the
phenomenon of mass litigation, and in particular the work of the
American Law Institute’s Complex Litigation project, by suggesting
that we were finally confronting the consolidation conundrum.5  I
applauded the effort to bring consolidation of separate cases into
some conformity with class-action treatment, particularly in terms of
when consolidation was appropriate and policing of the handling of
the aggregate litigation that would result.  But I also predicted that
the statutory recommendations emerging from the ALI Project were
unlikely to be adopted by Congress.6
Much has happened since then.  In 1996, the Advisory Commit-
tee published a set of possible amendments to Rule 23 that included
some revisions to class certification standards under Rule 23(b)(3)
and the introduction of a new Rule 23(b)(4) to authorize certification
solely for settlement.7  Those proposals produced a lot of controversy
and a lot of comment; eventually Judge Niemeyer had the commen-
tary published in four volumes that he brought with him when he
testified before Congress as quoted above.8  In 1997 and again in
1999, the Supreme Court made important decisions on mass tort class
actions.9
4 Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Const. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 37 (June 1, 2012)
(opening statement of Rep. John Conyers).  Rep. Conyers spoke after the chair, Rep.
Trent Franks (R. Ariz.) and the ranking member of the minority, Rep. Jerome Nadel
(D. N.Y.) had spoken.  A video of the hearing can be found at: http://judiciary.house.
gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear_06012012.html.
5 See generally Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995
BYU L. REV. 879, 881 (1995).
6 See id. at 921–23.
7 See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D.
559, 559–66 (1996).
8 See WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, vol. I–IV (Admin. Off. of U.S. Courts, May 1, 1997).
9 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
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In 2003, Rule 23 was amended to deal with procedures attending
class certification rather than the criteria for certification. 10  In 2005,
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)11 expanded federal-court juris-
diction for class actions asserting claims based on state law and made
them subject to federal class-action rules and decisions.12
In 2009, the ALI published its Principles of the Law of Aggregate Liti-
gation,13 which addresses both class actions and other forms of
aggregation.
In 2010 and 2011, the Supreme Court decided an exceptional
number of class-action cases,14 and it seems that more are on the
way.15  Certainly these decisions do not reflect wholehearted enthusi-
10 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 215 F.R.D. 159,
159–69 (2003).
11 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1711–15 (2006)).
12 For discussion, see generally Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdic-
tional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1790 (2008).
13 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2009).
14 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011) (overturn-
ing class certification in an employment discrimination case charging Wal-Mart with
company-wide gender discrimination); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375–82
(2011) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act prevented a federal judge who had
already denied class certification from enjoining the submission of a similar class-
certification request to the West Virginia state courts on behalf of a very similar class);
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184–87 (2011) (holding
that plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action did not have to establish “loss causa-
tion” to obtain class certification); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1753 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California case law
that would invalidate as unconscionable a class action waiver in a consumer contract
requiring arbitration of disputes); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 supported class
certification in a case involving claims based on New York law even though a New
York statute forbade class actions for such claims); see also Philip Morris USA Inc. v.
Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (granting a stay of a class-action
judgment entered by a Louisiana state court in the expectation that the Supreme
Court would grant certiorari and reverse).
15 See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (2012) (involving defendant’s effort to defeat
certification in a securities fraud case premised on “fraud on the market” by proving
“truth on the market”—that there was no concealment); Behrend v. Comcast Corp.,
655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No.
11-864) (discussed infra note 133); Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp, 656 F.3d 189, R
cert granted sub nom. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 80 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S.
June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1059) (raising question whether plaintiff may defeat removal
of state-court class action under Class Action Fairness Act by attempting to limit the
damages sought for the unnamed class members to less than $5 million, the cutoff for
federal court jurisdiction under the Act); Knowles v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 2011 WL
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asm for class action,16 and some see them contributing to “the decline
of class actions.”17  At least one piece of legislation has already been
introduced in Congress to undo the effects of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes18 and facilitate combined liti-
gation in employment discrimination cases.19
On June 1, 2012, as suggested by the quotation above from Rep.
Conyers, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judici-
ary Committee held a hearing focusing on the impact of CAFA and
addressing more generally a variety of issues about class-action
practice.20
Finally, in early 2012 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules cre-
ated a Rule 23 Subcommittee to consider whether some further
amendments to the class-action rule might warrant serious
consideration.21
6013024 (W.D. Ark., Dec. 2, 2011), cert granted sub nom. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.
Knowles, 80 U.S.L.W. 3680 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 11-1450) (raising the question
whether a “collective action” under the Fair Labor Standards Act can be mooted by a
Rule 68 offer to the named plaintiff of the full amount claimed before the time to
move for “certification” of the collective action).
16 See Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing
Into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1047 (2012) (discerning no over-
arching theme in recent Supreme Court decisions).
17 See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
18 131 S. Ct. 2541.
19 See Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act, S. 3317, 112th Cong.
(2012).  This bill asserts that “[c]lass actions often have been the most effective means
to enforce employment discrimination laws,” and that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Wal-Mart “made it more difficult for victims of discrimination to vindicate claims
for their rights.” Id. at 2–3.  The purpose of the bill is “to restore employees’ ability to
challenge, as a group, discriminatory employment practices, including subjective
employment practices.” Id. at 4.  To that end, it authorizes “group actions” challeng-
ing employment practices under certain federal antidiscrimination statues, and
prescribes treatment in such suits similar to what Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 provides for class
actions.  It says that claimants must elect between class-action and “group action”
treatment within the time to move for certification under Rule 23. Id. at 6–7.
20 For details on this hearing, including the written statements of the witnesses
and a video of the hearing itself, see the website cited supra note 4.  The monthly R
magazine of the American Association for Justice reports ruefully that the Association
“expects the Judiciary Committee’s interest in class action litigation to continue, and
it may introduce a bill that would further erode consumers’ rights.” Justice in Motion,
TRIAL, Aug. 2012, at 48.
21 For discussion of the issues identified so far by this Subcommittee, see ADVI-
SORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING OF MAR. 22–23, 2012, MEMO REGARDING RULE
23 ISSUES 449–72, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2012-03.pdf.
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Though much has changed, then, much remains the same—
aggregation of litigation is still a hot topic.  Beyond a doubt, the field
is rife with issues that could be addressed.  The Advisory Committee’s
initial review identified well over a dozen that might call for further
consideration of possible rule changes.22  The articles in this federal
courts issue of the Notre Dame Law Review focus on several of the most
challenging contemporary questions about aggregate litigation, not
limited to class actions.  I write here to offer some ruminations about
how aggregation controversies have evolved since 1995, and why we
are still confronting the consolidation conundrum.  I hope that these
thoughts will provide a context for the other contributions to this
issue.  In particular, I will focus on three topics: (1) the basic chal-
lenge that underlies all litigation aggregation, not just class actions or
multidistrict litigation (MDL) proceedings; (2) the distinctive role liti-
gation has in the U.S. (often called American Exceptionalism) and
how that affects our attitudes toward collective litigation here; and (3)
the abiding perils that attend the decision whether to authorize com-
bined litigation.
22 As set forth in the Agenda Memo for the Advisory Committee’s March, 2012
meeting, the “front burner” list included five items: (1) revising criteria for review of
proposed class-action settlements; (2) merits review on class certification; (3) use of
“issue classes” under Rule 23(c)(4); (4) separate authorization in the rule for certifi-
cation solely for purposes of settlement; and (5) the propriety of monetary relief in
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 455–64.
The agenda memo also identified “back burner” issues that might warrant fur-
ther attention: (1) fundamentally revising Rule 23(b) to make it more functional; (2)
revising Rule 23(a)(2)’s common question requirement (with possible implications
for Rules 20(a), 24, and 42(a), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1407); (3) restoring a require-
ment for court approval of “individual” settlements; (4) revisiting the “predomi-
nance” or “superiority” language in Rule 23(b)(3); (5) revising the notice
requirements, particularly with reference to the possibility of notice by a means other
than first-class mail; (6) addressing some of the implications of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010),
particularly its indication that Rule 23(a) commands certification of a class in some
circumstances; (7) addressing choice of law issues in class actions; (8) refining the
attorney fee awards provisions now provided in Rule 23(h); (9) developing rule provi-
sions to address the binding effect of class-certification or settlement-review decisions
of federal courts, a topic addressed in part in Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368
(2011); (10) considering a rule provision authorizing aggregation by consent in
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 465–72.
It should be stressed that this listing, while long, is at best preliminary.  Limited
work has been done to make sure that all topics warranting attention have been iden-
tified, and the separation of those currently identified into “front burner” and “back
burner” categories was very preliminary.
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I. THE BASIC AGGREGATION CHALLENGE
I begin—as I did in 1995—emphasizing that aggregation can pre-
sent challenges in many settings.  In each of them, the key question is
whether the common features justify combined litigation.  In each of
them, combining claims presents risks as well as advantages.  The
larger the combination, the larger the challenges, but perhaps also
the larger the benefits.  That’s the aggregation challenge.
It’s not just class actions that can cause aggregation heartburn.
Class actions do, clearly, get the most press.  Class actions are the one
procedural tool that I know entering law students will recognize on
the first day of civil procedure.  I ask them whether they’ve ever heard
of the work product doctrine, or interpleader, or removal, and
(except for a few former paralegals) the answer is no.  But when I ask
them whether they have heard of class actions, all or almost all say yes.
They’ve even heard about class actions in Hollywood movies.
Lawyers and the legal academy have long since learned that class
actions are not the only big game in town.  More than twenty years ago
Professor Silver was comparing class actions and consolidations.23
Indeed, with the growing challenges facing those who bring class
actions, in some instances MDL or other combined treatment is more
inviting.24  Even the general press has gotten the hint.  For example,
in 2010 a Wall Street Journal article noted that “[i]n recent years,
thousands of suits filed across the U.S. in some of the biggest product
liability and personal injury cases—from harmful diet drugs to smelly
Chinese drywall—each have been consolidated into ‘multidistrict liti-
gation’ cases.”25  A National Law Journal article reported:
The number of cases winding their way through the multidistrict
litigation (MDL) process across the country has more than doubled
during the past decade, inundating both the MDL panel, which
decides where those cases should be consolidated, and the federal
judges who ultimately end up handling discovery in such complex
cases.26
23 See generally Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV.
LITIG. 495, 497 (1991).
24 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If a
Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 (2008) (discussing the resort to
alternative methods in the face of growing challenges to certifying a class).
25 Dionne Searcey, BP Suit’s Complex Legal Structure Scrutinized, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870389720457548797023
9591754.html.
26 Amanda Bronstad, Swelling Docket Challenges System, NAT’L. L.J. (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202472164256&Swelling_docket
_challenges_system&slreturn=20120829091412.
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The interaction of the MDL process and class actions can further
complicate the already-complicated challenges of modern mass litiga-
tion.  Thus, in testimony before Congress in June 2012, both plaintiff
and defendant lawyers decried the results for this interaction.  A lead-
ing plaintiff lawyer urged that the combination of CAFA’s increase in
federal-court jurisdiction and the near certitude that the MDL panel
would transfer class actions that might overlap to a single judge for
centralized pretrial handling has meant that state-wide class actions
that might be certified if they were handled separately in state court
are denied certification by the federal MDL court because the combi-
nation of many of them causes insuperable management difficulties.27
A leading defense lawyer complained at the same hearing about the
refusal of some MDL transferee judges to decide class-certification
issues,28 perhaps leaving those for resolution later after the cases are
returned to their home districts, and seemed disappointed that some
judges were not doing what the plaintiff lawyer who testified protested
that too many were doing.  In this setting, Professor Bradt’s contribu-
tion, providing a careful analysis of the choice-of-law issues that result
from “direct filing” in MDL proceedings,29 underscores the complexi-
ties that aggregate litigation can produce.
But MDL processes are not the only non-class action focus of con-
cern.  The Class Action Fairness Act itself included in its provisions a
“mass action,” which it defined as “any civil action . . . in which mone-
tary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried
jointly . . . .”30  As CAFA’s mass action concept suggests, the starting
point for the consolidation debate is the simplest combination deci-
27 See Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Const. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4–8 (2012) (state-
ment of Thomas M. Sobol, Managing Partner, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/Sobol%200601
2012.pdf.
28 See id. at 13–14 (statement of John H. Beisner, on Behalf of the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hear-
ings%202012/Beisner%2006312012.pdf.
29 See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Mul-
tidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759 (2012).  Direct filing occurs when a
new plaintiff files suit in the MDL transferee district rather than in his or her home
district, from which the case would be transferred to the MDL district as a “tagalong”
action.  But under existing choice-of-law doctrine, direct filing can produce peculiar
results, a problem Professor Bradt seeks to solve by having the direct-filing plaintiffs
declare their “home forum,” leading to application of the choice-of-law rules of that
home forum to the claims asserted in the direct filing in the MDL court.
30 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (2006).
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sion—permissive joinder of parties—what I have called the “aggrega-
tion tension.”31
The courts have been calibrating that tension for quite some
time, and in general they seem to have become more exacting in their
calibration.  The calibration begins with the simplest of combina-
tions—say, the joinder of two unrelated plaintiffs suing for injuries
sustained in an auto crash.  It is easy to find differences between them,
and to elaborate on the basic situation to complicate the picture.  It is
easier, for example, to justify the combination if both were passengers
in a vehicle hit by the defendant than if they were in separate vehicles
that defendant hit a block apart.  It would be easy to conclude that
such a combination makes sense if both plaintiffs object to largely the
same driving behavior of defendant—say, speeding, texting while driv-
ing, etc.32  And that would seem to fit readily within the permissive
joinder provisions of Rule 20(a), which authorizes joinder by plaintiffs
who assert rights “arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences.”33
The key problem even in the simple multiple collision example is
to determine whether such a “series” has been alleged.  In one sense,
there was a series—one of the accidents happened before the other
one.  And Rule 20(a) adds another requirement—that there also be a
“question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs.”34  In the most
abstract sense, there is surely a question of law common to the two
crash cases—whether defendant drove negligently, for example.  Does
that commonality (that the issue is governed by the same legal stan-
dard that first-year law students study in torts) mean that it is common
enough to justify combination?  Does it depend on showing that the
same actual behavior (reckless driving or speeding starting before the
first crash and continuing through the second one a block away) con-
tinued throughout the episode?
The rule does not really answer this question.  With “mass
actions,” it can assume fairly dramatic importance; if more than 100
plaintiffs combine their claims under this rubric, one might look care-
31 See Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maxi-
malist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245,
2250–58 (2008).
32 Cf. Eric Morath & Erica Orden, Commerce Head Takes Leave, WALL ST. J. (June
12, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230376810457746015316
5951294.html (describing two auto accidents involving John Bryson, then Secretary of
Commerce, that happened one after the other, where there was a possibility that
Bryson had suffered a seizure).
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A).
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(B).
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fully at whether their individual claims really share common features
sufficient to justify combined litigation.  Not surprisingly, courts con-
fronted with such situations sometimes resort to distinctive measures
to winnow and streamline the litigation.35  Such unusual measures are
not needed in our garden-variety suit involving two or three plaintiffs
injured in an auto accident.  But one consequence of this sort of
immediate scrutiny of the claims of individual plaintiffs is to deter-
mine whether they can properly be combined into a single case.
Determining whether there is sufficient commonality to justify
combined litigation is crucial and elusive.  Surely at some point, the
asserted commonalities must be regarded as insufficient.  One view of
the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision is that it draws such a line
relying on the “common questions” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).36
The Court’s substantive basis for the line it drew in that case seems to
be that the evidence provided did not show a violation of Title VII
because Wal-Mart delegates discretion to managers to make salary and
promotion decisions, and that the delegation is permitted under Title
VII even though it could have contributed to reduced representation
of women in higher levels of Wal-Mart management.37  At some point,
there must be such a line, whether or not one accepts the point at
which the Court drew that line.  As Professor Rutherglen points out in
his contribution to this issue, this judgment must be made in light of
the merits of the case.38
The point can be illustrated by referring back to General Telephone
Company of the Southwest v. Falcon,39 the Supreme Court’s 1982 Title VII
class-action case on which Wal-Mart built.  There the Court rejected
the Fifth Circuit’s “across the board” rule on class certification in
employment discrimination cases.40  That rule originated in a 1969
case in which the court of appeals reversed a district judge’s refusal to
certify a class action in a suit by a fired African-American former
employee of defendant who claimed he had been fired for com-
35 See, e.g., Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir.
2011) (detailing how in proposed suits on behalf of more than 1,000 individually-
named plaintiffs, district court ordered that each plaintiff provide details on alleged
exposure to toxics); Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 338, 340 (5th Cir.
2000) (detailing how district court required some of the more than 1,000 plaintiffs to
specify and provide expert reports about their alleged injuries before permitting liti-
gation to proceed).
36 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–51, 2556–57 (2011).
37 Id. at 2554.
38 See George Rutherglen, The Way Forward After Wal-Mart, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 871 (2012).
39 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
40 Id. at 160–61.
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plaining about racial discrimination by his Georgia employer.  The
court’s opinion held that refusing class certification was an error
because “it is clear from the pleadings that the scope of appellant’s
suit is an ‘across the board’ attack on unequal employment practices
alleged to have been committed by the appellee pursuant to its policy
of racial discrimination.”41  The decision was that plaintiff’s challenge
to this policy of racial discrimination was not properly limited to those
who had suffered his exact fate—retaliatory discharge for com-
plaining about the racially biased policy.
On its face, an “across the board” rule for joinder of every sort of
employment discrimination in a single suit appears too broad.  On
that score, consider Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 42 which has been
described as “possibly the leading case on joinder of Title VII plain-
tiffs.”43  In that case, the district judge had severed the claims of the
ten plaintiffs into individual suits on the ground they were not prop-
erly joined under Rule 20(a).  Plaintiffs there were current or former
employees of either the Chevrolet or Fisher Body division of defen-
dant.  Plaintiffs alleged a long catalog of bad practices by one or the
other of the two divisions of GM named in the suit: (1) discriminating
against African Americans regarding “promotions, terms and condi-
tions of employment”; (2) retaliating against African Americans who
protested against such violations of Title VII; (3) failing to hire Afri-
can Americans due to racial bias; (4) failing to hire women due to
gender discrimination; and (5) discriminating against African Ameri-
can and female employees “in the granting of relief time.”44
Applying an “across the board” notion of commonality to Mosley
leaves one asking “what board?”  Is it all discriminatory activities of any
sort?  By now, there are legal prohibitions on many kinds of employ-
ment discrimination, including discrimination not only on the basis of
race and gender, but also national origin, religious affiliation, age, dis-
abilities, and others.  Looking to the Fifth Circuit’s 1969 case, it does
not seem that plaintiff there was inclined in such an unbounded
direction; in that case, the court quoted a 1963 decision that involved
a claim “directed at the system wide policy of racial discrimination[,
and that] sought obliteration of that policy of system-wide racial
discrimination.”45
41 Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969).
42 Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974).
43 Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 202 F.R.D. 142, 144 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
44 Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1331.
45 See Johnson, 417 F.2d at 1124 (quoting Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288–89 (5th
Cir. 1963)).
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Viewed from the 1960s South, adopting an “across the board” atti-
tude toward racial discrimination claims had much to recommend it;
the judges who endorsed this attitude were in a hurry to do a lot,
because a lot needed to be done fast.  But as a policy, even for inter-
preting Rule 20, it leaves much to be desired.  At some level, it seems
inconsistent with the commitment underlying Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403 to guard against introduction of “character” evidence.46  At
what point are the ten plaintiffs who joined together in Mosley basi-
cally trying to get before the jury episodes of alleged bad behavior by
defendant that essentially are unrelated to their suit?  The Supreme
Court has since curtailed reliance on bad experiences of other
employees to support the claim of the plaintiff before the court.47
Certainly, plaintiffs in other sorts of litigation seem to have been
intent on pursuing such a strategy of emphasizing defendants’ unre-
lated unsavory actions.48
Putting aside fairness to defendants, in the class-action context
there are real risks for plaintiffs in employing too broad a brush.  In
the 1969 case that originated the Fifth Circuit’s “across the board”
rule, Judge Godbold concurred specially with an opinion later quoted
by the Supreme Court in Falcon:
One act, or a few acts, at one or a few places, can be charged to be
part of a practice or policy quickening an injunction against all
racial discrimination by the employer at all places.  It is tidy, conve-
nient for courts fearing a flood of Title VII cases, and dandy for the
46 FED. R. EVID. 403.
47 See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008)
(upholding the district judge’s Rule 403 determination in an age discrimination case
to exclude evidence proffered by plaintiff about allegedly discriminatory actions of
supervisory employees of defendant other than plaintiff’s supervisor, who was alleged
to have discriminated against plaintiff).
48 See, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
Plaintiffs there sued to recover for injuries allegedly resulting from use of the drug
Bendectin, which defendant manufactured.  They sought discovery of defendant’s
experiences with two other drugs defendant had manufactured, Thalidomide and
MER-29, arguing that such information would shed light on the validity of defen-
dant’s testing procedures and its “common plan” to withhold and falsify information
about its pharmaceutical products. Id.  The court rejected plaintiffs’ discovery
requests, reasoning as follows:
Evidence of defendant’s actions relating to Thalidomide and MER-29 is not
relevant to this litigation.  Whatever probative value such evidence might
have would be far outweighed by its potential prejudice to defendant. . . .
[T]he [discovery] requests appear calculated to produce information which
would portray defendant in a damaging light with regard to some of its past
activities.
Id.
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employees if their champion wins.  But what of the catastrophic
consequences if the plaintiff loses and carries the class down with
him, or proves only such limited facts that no practice or policy can
be found leaving him afloat but sinking the class?49
Even though it is not surprising to find that courts in the South in
the 1960s took an aggressive attitude toward commonality in discrimi-
nation class actions, it is also not surprising to find that the courts
have become more demanding regarding the showing necessary to
justify class certification.50  And the variety of situations in which even
party joinder may raise red flags is fairly broad.
In 2011, for example, the Legal Director of the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation wrote of what she called “a new litigation strategy” by
copyright holders against those who copy their copyrighted materi-
als—“mass copyright litigation.” 51  Reportedly, copyright holders file
suit in a convenient jurisdiction against large numbers of Doe defend-
ants, seek discovery to identify the Does before service on them, and
then seek to settle for $2,000 to $5,000 per defendant, much less than
the cost of defense, but a very substantial sum for these individual
users nonetheless.  This activity threatened what she called “concerns
rooted in due process,” including joinder limitations.  As she
explained, there should not be sufficient commonality to justify join-
der, because “[t]he only thing linking the defendants in these cases is
the use of a computer protocol, called BitTorrent, to allegedly
infringe the same movie.”52  Dealing with the “mass” copyright suits,
the courts have sometimes upheld and sometimes rejected joinder.53
49 Johnson, 417 F.2d at 1126 (Godbold, J., specially concurring).  See Gen. Tel. Co.
Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982), where Justice Stevens quotes Judge
Godbold in the Supreme Court’s Falcon decision.
50 This topic will come up again in Part III, infra.
51 Cindy Cohn, Mass Copyright Litigation: New Challenge for the Federal Courts, S.F.
DAILY J., Apr. 18, 2011, at 5.
52 Id.  In somewhat the same vein, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act included
a provision saying that in patent infringement cases joinder is not proper “based
solely on allegations that [defendants] each have infringed the patent or patents in
suit.”  Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 333 (2011). See 35 U.S.C. § 299(b)
(Supp. V 2011) (awaiting publication by The Office of the Law Revision Council).
Perhaps that was not motivated by “mass patent suits,” but it does bespeak a height-
ened interest in joinder in intellectual property litigation.
53 See, e.g., Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. 669
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that joinder of John Doe alleged users of peer-to-peer file
sharing program was improper); On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, 280 F.R.D. 500
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (same); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, 279 F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (same); Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1-131, 280 F.R.D. 493 (D. Ariz. 2012)
(same); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Smith, 274 F.R.D. 334 (D.D.C. 2011) (uphold-
ing joinder of putative users of peer-to-peer file-sharing with regard to distribution of
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In sum, the whole question where the dividing lines should be
drawn for “simple” party joinder decisions are eminently contestable.
But at least those cases involve either plaintiffs who have actually
signed up to sue, or defendants who have actually been sued.  Class
actions, particularly plaintiff class actions, present a more aggressive
use of the court’s aggregation power, because it is the court’s order
that makes the litigation destinies of all class members rise or fall
together.  MDL proceedings are somewhat in between; the plaintiffs
did choose to sue, but they may well not have chosen to sue as part of
the aggregate litigation.  Arguably Wal-Mart’s strict attitude toward
commonality could extend to many joinder methods beyond class
actions.
Professor Effron has recently argued that the flexibility of our
joinder rules has produced “shadow rules” that explain the courts’ dif-
ferentiation among cases that seem to be governed by rule provisions
that describe the joinder criteria using virtually identical language.54
In particular, she finds that courts have developed what she calls
“implied predominance,” emphasizing in simple joinder decisions
concepts like the “predominance of common questions” finding nec-
essary to justify class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).55  She is uncer-
tain whether the “common question” decision in Wal-Mart will radiate
backwards and affect joinder decisions under these other rules,56 but
urges that the various rules that now use the same joinder terminology
specific movie); First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(upholding joinder); W. Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-5829, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011)
(upholding joinder).
54 Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759, 762 (2012).
55 See id. at 789–94.
56 See id. at 803.  Professor Effron states:
The Wal-Mart decision is most likely to bleed into Rule 20(a) or Rule 42(a)
decisions when joinder or consolidation under these rules is sought as an
alternative or second-best option to class certification.  Evidence for this
path appears in some Rule 24(b) permissive-intervention cases.  Courts con-
sidering permissive intervention were far less likely to invoke implied pre-
dominance [of common issues] than courts considering permissive joinder
or Rule 42(a) consolidation.  The glaring exception to this pattern, however,
occurs in permissive-intervention cases in which a court had first considered
class certification, permissive joinder, or consolidation for the proposed
intervenors.  In these cases, implied predominance appears as part of the
permissive-intervention reasoning.  A similar migration of Wal-Mart concepts
and analysis from Rule 23 to Rules 20(a) and 42(a) therefore seems particu-
larly likely in cases where a judge has already conducted Rule 23 commonal-
ity analysis about a group of claimants.
Id.
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should be revised to calibrate the decision more precisely to the issue
before the court and thereby confine judges’ discretion.
Frankly, the prospect of improving the handling of joinder deci-
sions by rewriting the joinder rules is hard to embrace.  The parallel-
ism of the current rules resulted from the 1966 revision of all the
joinder rules in a functional manner.  The basic problem is not so
much manner of expression as the difficulty of the underlying combi-
nation conundrum.  That conundrum exists unless one adopts a rule
(like the old common law rule) that joinder is forbidden, or says that
joinder is always allowed whenever any party wants it.  Whatever the
frustrations of the current regime, it is superior to those two alterna-
tives.  And it means that judges have to juggle imponderables with
some frequency.  But the current salience of the debate—extending
now into the electronic frontier—attests to its abiding importance.
II. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE VIEW FROM ABROAD
Several of the contributions to this Issue—those of Mr. Lavie,57
Professor Gilles,58 Mr. Noll,59 and Professor Garrett60—bear generally
on the distinctive law-enforcement role of some private litigation in
this country, and invite comparison with attitudes of the rest of the
world toward aggregation.  Curiously, given the generally relatively
“individualistic” cast of American society, in litigation—particularly
class actions—the U.S. is prone to favor group resolution in situations
in which other countries do not.  In large measure, that American
attitude results from our reliance on private litigation to enforce pub-
lic law.  Limiting aggregation could hobble law enforcement, a risk
explored by several of these contributions.
Specifically, Mr. Lavie laments the risk that, in the wake of Wal-
Mart, prospective defendants may be able to alter their conduct in
ways that minimize the prospect that plaintiffs who sue them will
achieve class certification.61  Some might regard this sort of reaction
as a way to foster law enforcement, or at least law obedience,62 but
57 Shay Lavie, The Malleability of Collective Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697
(2012).
58 Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitra-
tion Clauses After AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2012).
59 David L. Noll, Rethinking Anti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649
(2012).
60 Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 593 (2012).
61 See generally Lavie supra note 57. R
62 See, e.g., Alice Wang, Best Policies to Avoid Class Actions, THE RECORDER, May 28,
2012, at 18, available at http://www.laborlawyers.com/showarticle.aspx?Best-Policies-
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surely some class-avoidance behaviors by prospective defendants
would be less salutary.  Professor Gilles launches another broadside at
mandatory arbitration clauses favored by Concepcion, seeking escape
from its tendrils in order to enhance the power of public courts to
enforce public law.63  Mr. Noll also focuses on AT&T v. Concepcion,
offering a nuanced approach to anti-aggregation contractual provi-
sions, focusing on whether the provision enables the defendant to
engage in extensive, unremedied wrongdoing.64  Finally, following up
on very interesting arguments favoring aggregation in unfamiliar set-
tings, 65 Professor Garrett examines the important role class actions
have played in enforcing constitutional rights.66
In differing ways, these intriguing papers remind us of the 1970s
era of class-action litigation.  Indeed, Professor Chayes’s bemused
observation at the beginning of this paper came in his 1976 rumina-
tion about the growing impact of “public law” litigation in American
courts.67  In his view, that activity had supplanted most other litigation
in American courts.68  Carrying that sort of view toward its logical con-
clusion, Professor Fiss argued around the same time that requiring
public courts to resolve private disputes was “an extravagant use of
to-Avoid-Class-Actions&Type=36&ArticleType=3385&Show=15307.  This employment
lawyer offers the following general prescription: “Under some circumstances, if an
employer implements and enforces lawful policies, there is a stronger argument that
to determine whether a plaintiff’s class action contention—that unlawful conduct
occurred despite the employer’s lawful policies—will require a highly individualized
analysis, making certification inappropriate.”  This analysis reminds us of one theme
of Professor Rutherglen’s contribution, see supra note 38, that class certification can R
turn on merits judgments.  But beyond that, the detailed set of recommendations
from Ms. Wang—e.g., having clear policies, in written form and calling for immediate
reporting of violations of the policies, for which punishment can and will be imposed,
etc.—seem designed to cause employers to follow the law in order to avoid class certi-
fication.  That is hard to view as a bad result.
63 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) (criticizing the
Court’s decision in that case for its broad validation of arbitration provisions which
contain class action waivers).
64 See generally Noll supra note 59. R
65 See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383
(2007) (urging expanded aggregation in criminal litigation to ensure more consis-
tency of decision).
66 See generally Garrett supra note 60. R
67 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. R
68 See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284.  Chayes suggests that “the dominating charac- R
teristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise out of disputes
between private parties about private rights.  Instead, the object of litigation is the
vindication of constitutional or statutory policies.” Id.
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public resources, and thus it seems quite appropriate for those dis-
putes to be handled not by courts, but by arbitrators . . . .”69
Of course, the question of what is a purely “private” dispute
might prove hard to answer; one guesses that Professor Gilles is not as
thrilled as Professor Fiss might have been to relegate “private” dis-
putes with cell phone providers to arbitration.  The Supreme Court’s
enthusiasm for forcing litigants into arbitration could undermine the
effectiveness of private litigation as a way of enforcing the law.  Its
recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion70 could magnify
that effect by requiring not only arbitration but individual arbitration,
without the possibility of even class-wide arbitral resolution, particu-
larly important for small-value consumer claims.
An abiding and very difficult question is how properly to deter-
mine where enthusiasm for private enforcement of public rights
should stop.  Some seem to come close to viewing private enforce-
ment as worthy of unlimited resources.  It may be that Professor
Rosenberg comes close to this view.  For nearly thirty years he has pur-
sued a “public law” vision of the tort system that depends heavily on
the use of combined proceedings.71  Recently, that has led him to pro-
pose that the obstacle to aggregation resulting from the existence of
conflicting tort law in different states be solved by adoption of “aver-
age” law to apply in all cases.72  Putting aside the question of who can
implement this solution,73 this “solution” raises many knotty
69 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979).
70 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
71 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Pub-
lic Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) (urging the use of class-
action procedures to impose liability for the “added risk” resulting from activities
involving possibly toxic substances).
72 See Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law Problem of
Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 375
(2011).
73 It is not immediately obvious who has power to decree that “average” law apply
in class actions.  For a given state to do so might infringe due process or full faith and
credit limits on its freedom to disregard the law of other states.  For the federal
rulemakers to proclaim that use of such a technique is authorized for class actions in
federal court might be permissible under the Rules Enabling Act, but would arguably
be a challenge for the rulemaking authority.  Congress could presumably do so for
cases in federal court.  The ALI Complex Litigation Project made such a proposal in
1994. See AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS 306–09 (1994) (proposing adoption of a federal choice-of-law standard for
mass consolidated cases).  Whether it could also do so for cases in state court would
depend at least in part on the current scope of the Commerce Clause or some other
power of Congress.  (Unlike the Affordable Care Act situation, it does not seem likely
that the tax power would serve in this instance.)
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problems.  Should it apply only in class actions?  How does one deter-
mine what is an “average” law?  How about a class action involving a
class made up entirely of members from two states, with 90% of the
class members from one of those states?  Assuming one can find the
“average” between the tort law of State A and that of State B, should
we split the difference, even in the situation where the class consists
90% of class members from State A and only 10% for those from State
B?74  Whatever the challenges of the basic aggregation decision, dis-
cerning “average” state tort law looks far more challenging.
These daunting difficulties are worth confronting, the argument
seems to be, to ensure that class actions can be certified and their law-
enforcement value implemented.  Mr. Noll’s measured emphasis
seems to stop short of the most aggressive embrace of aggregation to
enable law-enforcement through private litigation.  Mr. Lavie’s contri-
bution reflects what appears to be a more wholehearted embrace of
law-enforcement objectives.  A recent article by Professor Campos
seems to go further yet, treating law enforcement by private litigation
as similar to the commons in The Tragedy of the Commons,75 positing
that the problem of asymmetric stakes will always give the defendant
an advantage over the plaintiffs, and proposing that—far from endan-
gering due process values—aggregation is the only path to true due
process.76
There is another view, and it seems to be representative of most
of the rest of the world, which may be a reason for caution in pursuing
the law-enforcement view too far too vigorously.  A starting point is to
recognize that the U.S. is not the only country with an “advanced”
democratic system meriting some respect.  That sounds silly, but the
occasional American embrace of singular features of American civil
litigation such as broad discovery seems so fervent as to deny that
there could be any other virtuous attitude.77  But it seems valuable in
74 Professor Rosenberg proposes sampling as a way to deal with at least some of
the challenges of administering the regime he favors, although it is not entirely clear
how that method can be used to devise the “average” law. See McCloud & Rosenberg,
supra note 72, at 401–03. R
75 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
76 Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1064
(2012). See also David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, On Structural Bias in the Litiga-
tion of Common Question Claims (Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 11-28, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1950196 (finding
that there is a structural bias favoring defendants in dispersed litigation involving
common questions).
77 Consider the title of a recent article about the current controversy about plead-
ing standards in federal court: Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery?  Assess-
ing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012).
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this increasingly globalized world to give some respect to the attitudes
of the rest of the world, or at least the other industrialized world.  And
the rest of the world looks at our discovery with something approach-
ing horror.78
The rest of the world looks on American class actions with some-
thing approaching its distaste for American discovery.  Until very
recently, the rest of the world had no class actions at all.79  To Ameri-
can eyes, that attitude stems in part from a misplaced concern with
the “autonomy” interests of class members, and is often offered as an
explanation while many European countries receptive to something
like class actions nonetheless resist opt-out treatment.  As Professor
Stadler recently explained:
Most European jurisdictions reject opt-out group actions as it is
almost impossible to guarantee that all group members receive the
information that a group action including their claims is pending.
If the victims do not opt out, the outcome of the litigation is bind-
ing for them.  In terms of their right to be heard and the right of
every claimant to decide for him- or herself whether to sue the
defendant or not, this construction seems to be highly
problematic.80
At least in terms of stakes, this preoccupation with the autonomy
of each group member seems overstated in small claims cases, some-
thing that even Professor Stadler recognizes by posing the problem as
The premise behind this title is that discovery is some sort of universal right, perhaps
even a human right.  True, in the U.S. we have come to regard access to discovery as
akin to constitutionally-based. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the
Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1024 (1998).  But Europe
is different: “The [European] codes of civil procedure of the 19th century strictly
adhered to the principle nemo tenetur edere contra se, i.e. the principle that no party has
to help her opponent in her/his inquiry into the facts.”  Nicolo` Trocker, Transna-
tional Litigation, Access to Evidence, and U.S. Discovery, in CURRENT TOPICS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LITIGATION 146, 156 (R. Stu¨rner & M. Kawano eds., 2009).
78 See generally Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First
Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153 (1999) (observing
that “America’s ‘unique’ discovery apparatus has raised hackles abroad”).  There is, of
course, a counter argument.  For an argument from within the civil law world endors-
ing adoption of American-style discovery, see KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DIS-
COVERY INTO CIVIL LAW (2003).  For present purposes, it suffices to note that this book
is an exhortation for the civil law world to do something it has not done.
79 For a trenchant comparison of American aggregate litigation to contemporary
developments on the continent, see Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across
the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009).
80 Astrid Stadler, Aggregate Litigation—Group/Class Actions in Germany, in LITIGA-
TION IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY 79, 84–85 (Peter Gottwald ed., 2010).
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“small damages—how to compensate the rational apathy of
consumers?”81
But more generally, Europeans and others simply don’t have the
same attitude toward permitting litigation on behalf of groupings con-
fected only for the purposes of litigation.  Thus, the European inclina-
tion is to recognize that groups have “standing” to sue on behalf of
their members or others.82  Indeed, in some places there is as a result
nothing to correspond to our class-certification decision because the
only pertinent question is whether the group in question has authority
to bring the group action.83  Although English group actions began in
medieval times as litigation on behalf of existing social groupings, as
Professor Yeazell has shown,84 the modern American reality goes far
beyond.  However much Facebook may have distended the notion of
“friend,” it is surely too much to regard all customers of a certain bank
or cell phone provider as sharing some significant social link.
This does not mean that aggregate litigation cannot generate
something akin to the medieval group affiliation.  To take one exam-
ple, consider litigation brought on behalf of people living near a toxic
waste site—they formed an organization to manage the resulting
litigation:
[D]espite their lack of common ailments or history, they still had to
devise a way to speak with one voice.  So they wrote a full constitu-
tion, complete with checks and balances.  The charter is divided
into six articles—only one fewer than the U.S. Constitution.  Article
II delimits the powers of the Steering Committee and enumerates
the duties of the Business, Property, Health and Guardian ad Litem
subcommittees.  There are definitions of a quorum, methods for
the conduct of business, and bylaws regarding the election of
officers.  Article VI details the proceedings for impeachment.85
81 Id. at 81.
82 See, e.g., id. at 82 (reporting that, in Germany, “consumer organizations now
have legal standing to bring actions on behalf of consumers”).
83 See, e.g., Vince Morabito, Clashing Classes Down Under—Evaluating Australia’s
Competing Class Actions Through Empirical and Comparative Perspectives, 27 CONN. J. INT’L
L. 205, 217 (2012) (noting that in Australia “the Federal and Victorian [class action]
regimes do not employ what are known in the US and Canada as certification
regimes”).
84 See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
85 Jack Hitt, Toxic Dreams: A California Town Finds Meaning in an Acid Pit, HARPER’S
MAG., July 1995, at 57, 61, available at http://harpers.org/archive/1995/07/0002121.
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Although there are examples of class actions that involve similar
group decisionmaking,86 there is certainly no requirement that there
be such a collective apparatus, which one would expect to find in
groups that genuinely exist independent of litigation.87
The reality is that the American group litigations are most often
the creature of the lawyers, and the reason we countenance that pecu-
liar feature is, as recognized long ago, to promote deterrence.88  Thus,
in his book examining evolving European attitudes towards group liti-
gation, Professor Hodges emphasizes the “profound distinction
between the U.S. and European approaches to the balance that is
struck between public and private law remedies,” because “the U.S.
model relies primarily on private enforcement, whereas the European
model relies primarily on public enforcement.”89  One can engage in
vigorous debate about whether “regulation through litigation” works
properly,90 and it is certainly possible to imagine a very different social
organization.91
86 See, e.g., Shauna I. Marshall, Class Actions as Instruments of Change: Reflections on
Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 911 (1995) (chronicling
efforts to achieve unity among class members in an employment discrimination action
brought on behalf of African Americans and women who were turned down for jobs
with the fire department).
87 Of course, the “groups” that exist in other settings may not have much inde-
pendent existence. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the
Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2001)
(describing the creativity of counsel in gathering together “groups” that qualified as
lead plaintiff under the PSLRA because they had the largest claims); 7B CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1806, at 437–40 (3d ed. 2005) (dis-
cussing the controversy about aggregation of a “group” of unrelated individuals to
satisfy the PSLRA requirements for a lead plaintiff group).
88 See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Con-
flict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 60–61 (1975) (arguing that the goal is deterrence,
but cautioning also that there is a risk of over-deterrence).
89 CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN
EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 196–97 (2008) (emphasis in original).
90 See, e.g., REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (review-
ing a recent class of high stakes litigation which allowed litigants to for regulatory and
policy changes).
91 See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence of Compensation—Deterrence Theory in
Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 417 (2012).  Geistfeld states:
[O]ne can imagine a society in which tort law is largely unnecessary.  All
risks could be regulated administratively, and all compensable harms could
be covered by insurance.  These institutions would adequately protect the
individual interest in physical security, eliminating this role from tort law.
The unrealism of this scenario does not detract for the significance of its
implications.  Unlike the United States, countries in the European Union
have less tort liability supplemented by more extensive administrative regula-
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Professor Strong’s contribution to this issue92 provides a welcome
antidote to a U.S.-centric attitude toward aggregation.  Recognizing
the general European antipathy toward U.S. class actions, it focuses
on a resolution adopted by the European Parliament in February
201293 endorsing creation of methods for collective redress.  In the
process, she examines the differing attitudes toward regulation
through litigation and considers the prospect of reconciliation.
Although this resolution (which has nor borne fruit in terms of actual
legislation) may signal some relaxation of the European view, it is
hardly a retreat.  Instead, it says “that Europe must refrain from intro-
ducing a US-style class system or any system that does not respect
European legal traditions,”94 and disavows anything approaching
American-style discovery.95  It also gives priority to government regula-
tors over private litigators.96  So even though this Resolution may sug-
gest there could be movement toward the American model, it is not
only incomplete but limited and cautious.  It surely stops far short of a
wholesale embrace of aggressive aggregation to effect private
enforcement.
Accepting our general emphasis on private enforcement through
litigation does not automatically lead to the conclusion that our cur-
rent handling of class actions stands on firm footing.  To the contrary,
Professor Redish has recently asserted in his book Wholesale Justice97
that Rule 23’s authorization of class actions is unconstitutional both
because it exceeded the rulemaking power and because it transforms
tion and government-provided insurance.  The reduced role of tort liability
in these liberal democracies hardly makes them less fair or less just than the
United States, just like the increased role of tort liability in the United States
hardly implies that Americans are litigation crazy.  Tort law is but one institu-
tion of many that protects individuals form physical harm, making the func-
tional importance of tort law contingent on the full range of complementary
institutions.
Id.
92 S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action
Have a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899 (2012).
93 European Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2012 on “Towards a Coherent
European Approach to Collective Redress,” P7_TA-PROV (2012) 0021.
94 See Strong, supra note 92, at 959 (quoting Resolution). R
95 See id. at 951, quoting the Resolution as follows:
[C]ollective claimants must not be in a better position than individual claim-
ants with regard to access to evidence from the defendant, and each claim-
ant must provide evidence for his claim; an obligation to disclose document
s to the claimants (“discovery”) is mostly unknown and must not form part of
the horizontal framework.
96 See id. at n.385.
97 MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE (2009).
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the underlying law, converting what would be a modest legislative
sanction into the litigation equivalent of a nuclear weapon.98  This is
not the place to delve deeply into the debates invited by Redish,99 but
it is the place to recognize that class actions can lead to overkill in a
way that might be avoided with administrative enforcement informed
by something like prosecutorial discretion.
Consider as an example the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act.100  It required retail outlets to reset their credit card
processing machinery to limit what appears on the receipt to the last
four digits of the customer’s credit card number, and permitted any-
one who suffered a violation to sue for $100 to $1,000 plus attorney
fees.  This is a prime example of using private litigation to enforce a
statutory prohibition that is, at most, malum prohibitum.  Of course,
millions of customers had emerged unscathed from having their full
credit-card numbers on receipts before the Act’s effective date.  Even
before the Act went into effect, the incidence of resulting credit card
fraud or identity theft must have been fairly low; claimants under the
Act need not prove any such injury to recover.
Of course, some retailers did not recalibrate their machines in
time to comply with the Act by the time it went into effect.  Of course,
there followed a spate of class actions on behalf of the customers of
such institutions.  Presented with a motion to certify in one such case,
a Florida district court found that class litigation was not superior
within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(3) because of the “potentially anni-
hilating” class-wide damages of $4.6 million to $46 million, particu-
larly since the statute did not require proof of any economic harm.101
In Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,102 the Ninth Circuit
rejected similar reasoning by another district judge.  That district
judge refused to certify because the defendant made a good faith
98 Id. at 228–32.
99 For further discussion, see Richard Marcus, Bomb-Throwing, Democratic Theory,
and Basic Values—A New Path to Procedural Harmonization?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013) (exploring ways in which Redish’s views on various matters, including
class actions, would move the U.S. toward harmonizing our procedure with that of
Europe). See also Alexandra D. Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 993, 993 (2011) (reviewing REDISH, supra note 97) (“For opponents of the class R
action, Martin Redish’s book Wholesale Justice provides some of the most theoretically
sophisticated arguments available.”).
100 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
101 Leysoto v. Mama Mia I., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 693, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
102 Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010).  A similar
concern arose in Truth in Lending Act class actions, eventually leading Congress to
amend that Act to place limits on defendant’s exposure. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 87, § 1804, at 392. R
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effort to comply with the Act after the suit was filed, and faced a liabil-
ity of between $29 million and $290 million for failure to comply
sooner.103  The court of appeals concluded that Congress could have
limited the use of class actions under the Act,104 but did not, and
therefore that Rule 23 applied in full force.105  Good faith efforts to
comply after suit was filed would not be a reason to deny class certifi-
cation for the pre-litigation victims of statutory violations, and the
potential magnitude of the defendant’s liability was not a legitimate
factor, but simply a consequence of class treatment authorized by the
rule.  In any event, it added, there was no indication defendant would
be bankrupted by the suit.106
Surely deterrence and enforcement are not the only values to be
considered.  Surely there can be cases in which the threat of class-
action treatment, particularly when coupled with the attendant
uniquely burdensome and intrusive American discovery apparatus,
overcomes very legitimate defenses, even including “I didn’t do it.”
Surely also, the interest in enforcement of “public law” has some limit.
What, for example, should be made of the copyright enforcement by
“mass copyright suits” as described above?107  The complaint there was
that litigation costs deterred defendants from defending.  Won’t litiga-
tion costs and stakes really make many cases “bet the company” cases?
And even in the “true” public law arena, there is at least considerable
reason for a circumspect attitude toward aggressive use of class-action
relief.  Contrast Professor Chayes’s enthusiasm for “public law litiga-
tion” with the much more recent views of Judge Frank Easterbrook,
who denounced a 1977 Seventh Circuit case as “a relic of a time when
the federal judiciary thought that structural injunctions taking control
of executive functions were sensible.  That time is past.”108
No doubt most legal academics side with Chayes rather than Eas-
terbrook.  Perhaps that is consonant with Professor Garrett’s contribu-
tion about the use of collective litigation to enforce constitutional
rights.  Using aggregation to enforce the constitution seems consider-
103 Bateman, 623 F.3d at 710.
104 Note that in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010), the Court refused to enforce in federal court a provision of state law enacted
by the New York Legislature to forbid class actions in suits for “penalties” authorized
by New York legislation. Id. at 1432.  For criticism of this decision, see Stephen B.
Burbank & Tobias Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 17, 19–20 (2010).
105 Bateman, 623 F.3d at 720 –21.
106 Id. at 723.
107 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. R
108 Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2008).
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ably more urgent than aggregation to enforce copyright claims,109 or
claims that a retailer failed to reset its credit-card machines so they
would print only the last four digits of the credit-card number on the
receipt.110  And the general question whether law enforcement should
be left to the State or depend on private litigation reminds us of other
such issues.111  For our purposes, the key point is that there are many
debatable issues lying behind the wholesale endorsement of using pri-
vate litigation to achieve deterrence or enforcement of law.  Recogniz-
ing that this is an example of American exceptionalism should make
us cautious about embracing a maximalist attitude toward aggrega-
tion.  As a consequence, properly calibrating the handling of these
issues—in gross or case by case—is a challenge we must continue to
confront for some time.
109 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text (discussing “mass copyright R
litigation”).
110 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. R
111 “Cultural” differences between countries can have deep historical roots.  On
this score, consider the sorts of antagonistic attitudes one sometimes finds in twenty-
first century French discourse about the “Anglo-Saxon” version of free-wheeling capi-
talism, contrasted with the French inclination toward a much more prominent
involvement of the government in industry.  One may be inclined to envision these
differences in twentieth or twenty-first century terms, but echoes of them can be
found in the eighteenth century.  Thus a half century ago, George Rude´ contrasted
England and France at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution in terms that sound
peculiarly pertinent today:
England, again, was peculiar [compared to countries on the Continent] in
that she alone, having embarked on an industrial “revolution,” was creating
a new and independent class of private manufacturers, who were beginning
to grow rich on the proceeds of industrial, rather than largely mercantile,
capital. . . . In France, manufacture was conducted either in large State
enterprises, such as the Royal “manufactories” of the Gobelins and Savon-
nerie, by master craftsmen in small workshops, or by merchant-manufactur-
ers directing the domestic labour of peasant weavers and spinners in cottage
industry. . . . In England alone, a distinct class of industrial entrepreneurs was
arising in the wake of the technical innovations introduced by the Darbys,
Hargreaves, Cort, Arkwright and Watt.
GEORGE RUDE´, REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE 1783–1815, at 21–22 (1964).
This historical contrast is obviously far afield from private litigation, but is a symptom
of a very different attitude one could almost describe as “cultural” about the role of
individual actors compared to the role of the State.  Even today, it is sometimes cen-
tral to discussion of economic policy.  Civil Procedure will not resolve this sort of basic
conflict in orientation.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 25  4-FEB-13 12:46
2012] still  confronting  the  consolidation  conundrum 581
III. HANDLING THE CHALLENGING DECISION WHETHER TO
AUTHORIZE AGGREGATION
As demonstrated by Professor Effron’s chronicle of the seeming
divergences among courts in deciding even relatively simple questions
like whether permissive joinder is allowed or a counterclaim is com-
pulsory,112 the decision whether to aggregate can be challenging.
Moving beyond those simplest situations to cases in which the court is
asked to consolidate separate cases or to decree that one case is a class
action on behalf of many others who have not chosen to sue com-
pounds the challenge.  And in at least some cases—sometimes
denounced as “drive-by certifications”—both the content and the
technique of the aggregation decision have seemed flagrantly faulty.
The question whether drive-by certifications happen frequently is
much contested, and cannot be resolved here.  Certainly something of
the sort has happened on occasion.113
All instances of combination potentially involve trade-offs.  As I
recognized in 1995, consolidation tends to change the litigation
dynamic in ways that may not be entirely positive, such as depriving
“bystander” parties (those not central to the action) of control over
their cases, simultaneously prompting the court to focus on the
central issues and “blend” the divergent ones together, and mag-
nifying the court’s temptation to sever issues for separate (and
likely later) consideration.114  It hardly seems that these concerns
have abated; given the rising frequency of MDL and other con-
solidation, they may have magnified.115  Consolidation also may limit
112 See supra notes 54–56. R
113 See In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing certifica-
tion granted by a judge in Hidalgo County, Texas, one week after an amended com-
plaint was filed and without any notice of the certification “hearing” to defendants).
114 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 890–97. R
115 For example, consider the recent report that MDL transfer will benefit the
“major players” on the defense side, but not the “small fish.”  Ruth Dowling and Flo-
rence Crisp explain:
These “uncommon” defendants face unique strategic and practical chal-
lenges.  It is exceedingly difficult for a single defendant to find an early exit
from an MDL.  The interests of the uncommon defendant will inevitably be
overshadowed by those of co-defendants whose very way of doing business
may be at stake.  And while the industry giant whose conduct is at issue
incurs lower litigation costs defending an MDL as opposed to dozens of dis-
parate cases around the country, the uncommon defendant, which likely
would not have been sued but for the MDL, faces increased costs borne of
the much larger litigation to which it is tagged.
. . . .
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the latitude of those whose claims are deemed central to the pro-
ceeding.116
The starting point, therefore, is to acknowledge that the decision
to consolidate is often very important.  Sometimes it may seem to be a
make-or-break point in the case.  For example, consider the complaint
of a plaintiff lawyer about a decision by the MDL Panel not to transfer
cases involving a pharmaceutical device, seemingly leaving plaintiff’s
counsel in the lurch.  She objected that, “[u]ntil recently, no one
would have dreamed that a mass pharmaceutical or medical device
tort would be denied multidistrict litigation (MDL) status. . . .  [But
i]n the past two years, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) has slowed down the rate at which it issues transfer orders.”117
The significance of consolidation may often be eclipsed in impor-
tance by class certification.  In the 1970s, the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that immediate appeal should lie from denial of class
certification because that decision was the “death knell” of the litiga-
tion.118  In 1995, Judge Posner famously legitimated using mandamus
to review the grant of class certification on the ground that the deci-
Having been swept into the MDL, an uncommon defendant can take
steps to manage its costs and chart its own course.  The uncommon defen-
dant should consider, and periodically re-evaluate, several key issues, includ-
ing whether to pursue an early exit strategy; whether to go it alone or join
forces with a joint defense group encompassing all or some defendants; how
to influence joint defense group decisions; and how best to manage moni-
toring, discovery and expert costs.  The uncommon defendant is under pres-
sure, both from MDL courts that prefer consolidated proceedings and joint
defense groups, not to diverge from the larger pack of defendants. . . .
Plaintiffs’ ability to control costs hinges on the defendants acting as a
group, filing joint motions and consolidated sets of discovery.  If the plain-
tiffs are required to respond to individual motions and/or discovery tailored
to the particular circumstances of an uncommon defendant, their incentive
to bring additional tag-along actions is reduced.  In practice, the MDL pro-
cess often works against the uncommon defendant’s attempt to have its cir-
cumstances individually considered, with courts often insisting that
defendants consolidate their motion practice.
Ruth Dowling & Florence Crisp, Sometimes the Small Fry Get Swept up in the Net, NAT’L
L.J., Sept. 20, 2010, at 12.
116 See In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 628 F.3d 157, 163 (5th
Cir. 2010).  In that case, a plaintiff argued on appeal that, had he been suing sepa-
rately, his motion to postpone the trial would have been granted, but that his motion
to postpone was denied because his case had been selected for a bellwether trial. Id.
at 161.  The court of appeals was unsympathetic: “Bell wanted to have his cake and eat
it by withdrawing from a bellwether trial and then sitting back to await the outcome of
another plaintiff’s experience against the appellees.” Id. at 163.
117 Leslie O’Leary, Out on Your Own, TRIAL, Nov. 2010, at 36.
118 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469–76 (1978).
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sion to confer class status could convert a serious case into a “bet the
company” case and leave the defendant no choice to settle even what
appeared to be very dubious claims.119  Whether that should be a con-
cern could at least be debated; a few years later Justice Sotomayor
(then on the Second Circuit) countered that “[t]he effect of certifica-
tion on parties’ leverage in settlement negotiations is a fact of life for
class action litigants.  While the sheer size of the class in this case may
enhance this effect, this alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper
certification.”120
In the class-action arena, similarly serious consequences attend
the decision to approve or disapprove a proposed class settlement.
That decision is often, of course, combined with a proposal to certify
the class for purposes of settlement.  As the Supreme Court has recog-
nized, the fact of settlement can affect the decision whether to
certify.121
Given the importance of these various decisions, one natural
response is to urge that more specific standards be developed to guide
judges’ decisions.  In 1995, I pointed to the desirability of clearer
guidelines for consolidation122 and applauded the ALI Complex Liti-
gation project for suggesting standards for consolidation that resem-
bled the ones used for class certification.123  Professor Effron urges
that clarification of joinder rules more generally would serve such pur-
poses.124  That’s the sort of reaction the disgruntled plaintiff lawyer
quoted above had about denial of consolidation in her medical device
case:
The [Multidistrict] [P]anel’s decisions are riddled with internal
inconsistencies.  Without proper appellate oversight, litigants have
no legal precedent to turn to for guidance about whether an MDL
petition will succeed.  This leaves plaintiff lawyers out on their own.
Because you have no idea how the panel will rule—and because it’s
likely that you won’t be granted consolidation—you should be pre-
pared to litigate your mass tort cases in multiple unfamiliar
jurisdictions.125
119 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 867 (1995).
120 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir.
2001).
121 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (ruling that
“[s]ettlement is relevant to a class certification”).
122 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 897–98. R
123 See id. at 901–13.
124 See Effron, supra note 54, at 810–14. R
125 O’Leary, supra note 117, at 37. R
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At some point, however, it seems unlikely that recalibration of
language will foster across-the-board improvements.  Though it might
be that separate aggregation standards for different kinds of cases
would permit more precise guidance, the downsides of abandoning
the “transsubstantive” orientation of our procedure rules126 generally
outweigh that possibility.  Phrased for all types of cases, they must be
more general.
General standards not only apply to different types of cases, but
also to different types of joinder.  Permissive joinder, the compulsory
counterclaim rule, MDL centralization, and class certification all turn
in some way on whether the various claims involve common issues.
But that does not tell us much about how intensely the court should
look at the exact issues and evidence likely to be presented in decid-
ing whether they are really sufficiently common to justify the type of
joinder involved.  Almost inevitably, the decision whether to aggregate
turns on some evaluation of the merits.  Commonality sufficient to
justify aggregation does not exist as an abstract concept.  Instead, a
key consideration is whether the issues that bear on resolution of sepa-
rate claims or claims raised by separate parties overlap in ways that
make joinder fair and efficient.  That sort of calculation is pertinent to
all aggregation decisions, and even more so with class certification or
MDL centralization, but can work differently in different litigation
settings.
Recognizing these starting points suggests at least three methods
of responding. First, one might urge that rules governing the aggrega-
tion decision should be clarified.  As I suggested in 1995, and Profes-
sor Effron urged more recently, revising legal standards for
combination might produce improvement.  In 1996, the federal
rulemakers proposed some revisions for the certification standards
under Rule 23(b)(3) 127 but these proposals were later withdrawn.  In
2003, the standards for approving a class-action settlement under Rule
23(e) were substantially altered to provide more direction.128  The
ALI Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation makes some such propos-
126 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2067 (1989) (describing the ways in which trans-substantivity minimizes political
pressures and what I would call “special deals” for certain types of cases).
127 See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559–60
(1996).
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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als regarding the standards for certification and settlement
approval.129
Besides legal standards, another important focus is the content
and information base for such combination decisions.  For MDL cen-
tralizations, it may be that the level of detail available to the Panel is
somewhat limited.  Tagalong cases,130 for example, have not even
been filed yet when the Panel makes its centralization decision, and
the Panel mainly examines the pleadings and seems to focus more on
the prospect of overlapping discovery than on the likely method of
combined judicial resolution of the disputed issues in the case.  For
some time, class certification decisions were made in a somewhat simi-
lar vacuum, often limited to the pleadings or “non-merits discovery.”
In the last decade, that focus has changed, and the former notion that
certification cannot depend on “merits decisions” has faded, as I have
recently written.131  Professor Rutherglen’s contribution to this issue
takes up similar issues,132 and the Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari to consider some of them.133  Further light may soon be
shed on these questions.  For those favoring care in making this
important decision, this development could be heartening.  For those
who want to improve the chances of aggregation, perhaps it is less
promising.
Second, in order to contain or constrain aggregation decisions,
one might be inclined to assign the decision whether to aggregate to
an expert body.  That, of course, is the MDL model.  The judges on
the Panel, chosen from across the nation134 and singularly exper-
129 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 2.02 (2009) (regarding application of the “predominance” concept under Rule
23(b)(3)); id. § 2.04 (regarding focusing on whether remedies sought are “indivisi-
ble” in making certification decisions under Rule 23(b)(2)); id. § 3.05 (specifying
matters not presently included in Rule 23(e) that could serve as the focus of settle-
ment-approval decisions).
130 These are later-filed cases sharing a common issue with cases the Panel has
already transferred as part of an MDL docket.  They are transferred rather automati-
cally to the transferee court, contributing to the “direct filing” phenomenon
addressed by Prof. Bradt. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 787 n.157. R
131 See Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the
Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 339 (2011).
132 See Rutherglen, supra note 38. R
133 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25, 2012)
(limiting the certiorari grant to the question of “[w]hether a district court may certify
a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible
evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding
damages on a class-wide basis”).
134 By statute, no two judges on the Panel may be from the same circuit. See 28
U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2006).
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ienced in the consolidation decisions that the Panel must make, could
be entrusted to make wiser decisions than randomly selected judges to
whom cases were assigned by coincidence.  Putting aside the objec-
tions of some lawyers that they do not do so,135 one might be left with
what could called a “structural” concern about the selection and ori-
entation of such “experts.”136  So there are at least questions about
whether this “expert panel” method is best.  And to the extent one is
inclined to rely on the experts, one might have less concern with the
clarity or detail of the standards they are to use.  They, after all, are
the experts.
Perhaps these experts should continue to monitor the progress of
the cases after they are transferred.  Developments in the case may go
in a different direction from what appeared likely at the outset (when
the centralization decision is usually made).  No matter how expert
they are, these experts cannot foresee everything.  But the Panel’s
authority is limited to the transfer decision, and does not extend to
what the assigned judge does with the cases (including making class-
certification and Rule 42 consolidation decisions).  Review of post-
transfer decisions on the cases is to the court of appeals with appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from the transferee district or, after retrans-
fer, the transferor district.
Even though the Panel has no formal appellate authority over the
decisions of the transferee judge it chose, it does have the power to
retransfer cases, a decision that could take account of what the trans-
feree judge has done with the cases.  In its early operations, it seemed
inclined to do that.137  But as we been told, the growing caseload is
“inundating . . . the MDL Panel,”138 with the result that the Panel “has
slowed down the rate at which it issues transfer orders.”139  Given the
burden it has keeping up with its growing responsibilities making ini-
tial centralization decisions,140 asking the Panel to supervise post-
transfer rulings does not seem workable.  Thus, for both statutory and
135 See supra text accompanying note 117 (reporting one lawyer’s lament that the R
Panel makes decisions she regards as inconsistent).
136 See Marcus, supra note 31, at 2283–91 (exploring the question whether the R
Panel setup might tend to select judges distinctly receptive to consolidation and
whether the Panel’s power to select the transferee judge might often focus on judges
similarly inclined and also inclined to press for “across-the-board” settlements).
137 See id. at 2273 (reporting on early instances of Panel oversight of transferee
judges’ actions).
138 See Bronstad, supra note 26, at 11. R
139 See O’Leary, supra note 117, at 36. R
140 Note that the judges on the Panel are not relieved of other judicial responsibil-
ities; these judges already have full-time jobs and heap their Panel responsibilities on
top of those jobs.
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practical reasons, the Panel members must rely on the transferee
judges, and will usually give no thought to retransferring the cases
(the only other responsibility of the Panel under the statute) unless
that judge recommends doing so.  So the reality is that the Panel’s
expert model is not a perfect fit even for MDL centralization, much
less the difficult and ongoing problem of aggregation in its many
forms.
For the most part, our class action law has gone in the opposite
direction from the expert technique.  Unlike some state courts, 141 for
class actions (like other civil actions) the federal courts rely on a ran-
dom assignment system rather than assigning them to “expert” judges.
Although the MDL panel is likely to transfer all cases involving poten-
tially overlapping classes to one court for combined proceedings,142
there is no requirement that one judge decide class certification in a
case pending before her in the same way another judge resolved that
issue in another case.  To the contrary, it has long been said that the
decision whether to certify a class is a matter of the judge’s discre-
tion.143  It might even be that a more “expert” judge would feel justi-
fied in certifying a class even though another had denied certification,
or that a judge might conclude that changed circumstances or addi-
tional information showed that the earlier certification ruling was
improvident.  One might almost say that we have approached the cer-
tification decision as though we were assuming district judges are all
expert, but without ensuring that they are.
Third, for those uneasy about untrammeled discretion in making
aggregation decisions, the solution seems to be appellate review.  That
was the solution proposed by the plaintiff lawyer upset about the MDL
Panel’s refusal to aggregate in her case.144  But with an “expert” body
like the Panel, appellate review seems unwarranted and perhaps
exactly the wrong thing because it would involve appeal from the
expert judges to the generalist judges.  It is not surprising that the
MDL statute forbids review of the Panel’s transfer decisions.145
141 In many metropolitan Superior Courts in California, for example, class actions
are assigned to a special Complex Litigation Department in which the judges are
specialists in handling this sort of case.
142 See DAVID HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 5.24, at 148 (2009) (“[I]f
there are conflicting or potentially conflicting class claims in the litigation, transfer is
likely regardless of the presence or absence of other factors that would otherwise
favor or militate against transfer.”).
143 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1561, 1607–08 (2003) (noting the increased invasiveness of appellate courts into a
district court’s discretion to certify in mass tort cases).
144 See supra text accompanying note 125. R
145 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2006).
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Review of class certification decisions is not similarly barred, but
it was initially not easy to justify.  Such a decision was, by definition,
not a “final decision” subject to immediate review. 146  Similar deci-
sions can be reviewed immediately when the district judge certifies
them to the appellate court on the ground that there is a ground for
uncertainty that the ruling was right and immediate review would
facilitate prompt resolution of the case in the district court.147  That
was how the permissive joinder decision in Mosley v. General Motors148
got before the appellate court.  But district courts with discretion to
certify or not in proposed class actions would not often regard their
decisions as dubious, and the Supreme Court early rejected the argu-
ment that review could be had on the ground that certification was
“collateral” to the merits.149  So the appellate courts were left with
only mandamus as a means of intervening in the district court’s han-
dling of these cases.  In 1995, for example, the Seventh Circuit
famously used that power to overturn class certification on the ground
it made settlement inevitable (and review impossible) because it
turned the case into “bet the company” litigation.150
In 1998, the addition of Rule 23(f), authorizing appellate courts
to review class-certification decisions in their discretion, substantially
changed things even though there was no change in Rule 23’s pre-
scribed rules for class certification.  Since then, a considerable body of
appellate law has developed to guide lower courts, perhaps providing
something like the sort of clearer standards some might endorse for
Rule 23 itself.
The appellate courts still say that they are reviewing district court
certification decisions for abuse of discretion.  But discretion is, of
course, a much used and perhaps abused concept.151  There is a range
of decision-making latitude conferred on American first-instance (trial
court) judges that differs from the practices of most other industrial-
ized countries, where supervision by higher-level courts is more fre-
quent and more intrusive.152  With such matters as class certification,
146 See id. § 1291.
147 See id. § 1292(b).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. R
149 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1978).
150 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303–04 (7th Cir. 1995).
151 For the leading treatments of the general question, see Henry J. Friendly, Indis-
cretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 762–67 (1982) (arguing discretion is a mat-
ter of degree); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion in the Trial Court, Viewed From
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971) (distinguishing between primary and sec-
ondary discretion).
152 See Richard Marcus, Appellate Review in the Reactive Model: The Example of the
American Federal Courts, in APPEALS AND OTHER MEANS OF RECOURSE AGAINST JUDG-
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it may be that over time the appellate courts gain familiarity and confi-
dence and therefore can exert more control.  Judge Friendly thought
so: “[a]buse of discretion can be found far more readily on appeals
from the denial or grant of class action status than where the issue is,
for example, the curtailment of cross-examination or the grant or
denial of a continuance.”153
Almost certainly, the intensity of appellate scrutiny of class certifi-
cation decisions has increased; a decision to accept immediate review
pursuant to Rule 23(f) implies that the appellate court sees some
need to change what this district judge did, or instruct other district
judges on how to handle similar problems.  It is possible to argue that
the urge toward appellate oversight of class-certification decisions can
be overdone, however.  Dean Klonoff, for example, has noted that the
actual experience under Rule 23(f) has seemed to favor defend-
ants.154  The Supreme Court, moreover, seemed in Shady Grove to put
at risk the entire notion that class certification is really a discretionary
matter.155
As more precise and numerous directives about certification ema-
nate from the courts of appeals or find their way into Rule 23, this
trend toward careful scrutiny is likely to continue.  For some, this may
be a hopeful sign, perhaps a good substitute for clearer rules them-
selves.  For others, it may simply shift the forum-shopping effort.
MENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS (Remco van Rhee & Alan Uzelac
eds, forthcoming 2013).
153 Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.).
154 See Klonoff, supra note 17, at 14.  Dean Klonoff states: R
[I]n terms of sheer numbers, Rule 23(f) has served primarily as a device to
protect defendants. . . .  Out of the 209 Rule 23(f) appeals accepted [from
November 30, 1998 through May 31, 2012], 144 (or about 69 percent) were
appeals by defendants after the grant of class certification, whereas only 65
(31 percent) were appeals by plaintiffs after the denial of class certification.
Of the 144 appeals by defendants, defendants were successful in 101 cases (a
70 percent reversal rate), while plaintiffs prevailed only 30 percent of the
time.  Of the 65 appeals by plaintiffs, defendants prevailed in only 26 cases
(or 30 percent of the time).  Thus, even when plaintiffs convinced the appel-
late court to grant review, they lost in the majority of cases.  In short, with
respect to appellate court rulings pursuant to Rule 23(f), defendants have
benefitted more from Rule 23(f) than have plaintiffs.
Id.
155 See Marcus, supra note 131, at 368–70.  The question whether a rule change to R
restore trial court discretion would be advisable has been raised. See Agenda Materi-
als, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 2011, at 643–45, available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2011-11.
pdf (outlining possible rule changes to restore district court discretion in regard to
certification).
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Thus, Federal Judicial Center researchers studying filing patterns of
federal-court class actions after CAFA made it easier to file or remove
such cases to federal court found that the increase seemed to be con-
centrated in circuits perceived by plaintiff lawyers as favorable on class
certification.156
In sum, the challenges of making the aggregation decision are
not likely to disappear.  Clearer guidelines may be possible, but likely
won’t be clear enough to replace individualized judicial decision-mak-
ing.  That decision-making will largely be by generalist judges who—to
some extent—will be operating under their own discretion.  It will
take account of, but perhaps not depend critically upon, some evalua-
tion of “merits issues.”  And appellate scrutiny, while occasionally cru-
cial, will probably remain relatively rare.
CONCLUSION
So here we are nearly twenty years later, still confronting the con-
solidation conundrum, even though there have been serious rulemak-
ing efforts, enhanced appellate scrutiny, new federal legislation, and
another ALI project about the subject.  Given the semi-intractable
challenges consolidation presents in its many forms, it is no wonder
we are have not put all the difficulties behind us, even though we have
surmounted some.  At the same time, as some of the contributions to
this issue suggest, we may be replacing old challenges with new ones,
such as the arbitration class-action waiver possibility.  We will likely
continue for further decades to do so, even though our understand-
ing of those challenges has improved.  In this Article, I suggest that
key features of our ongoing efforts to confront these problems will be
keeping in mind the variety of litigation contexts in which they can
appear, attending to the proper role of private litigation as a law-
enforcement tool in the U.S., and attending to the methods and con-
tent of judicial decisions to authorize combined litigation.
But improved understanding does not answer all questions; some
important ones depend on value judgments.  For example, should
American exceptionalism be embraced to empower every private liti-
gant (or lawyer) to pursue every claim on behalf of everyone who may
have been harmed because that’s the best way to achieve due process?
At some point, this sort of enthusiasm might provoke a popular revolt
along the lines recently articulated by The Haggler column in the New
York Times:
156 See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fair-
ness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1723, 1759 fig.6 (2008).
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 Class-action lawsuits have been denounced by businesses for
decades, and some of their arguments are compelling.  We’ve all
heard of settlements in which lawyers take home millions in fees
and consumers wind up with piddling sums, often in the form of
coupons.  Recently, Ferrero U.S.A. settled lawsuits brought by two
moms who said they were deceived by health claims made on jars of
the chocolate hazelnut spread Nutella.  Yes, if you brought Nutella
thinking it was spinach in a jar—actually, even if you brought it
because you find it delicious—you are a winner.
Is that really the most efficient way to deal with a reportedly
misleading health claim?  Maybe the Federal Trade Commission
could have handled that one.157
I certainly do not suggest wholehearted embrace of The Haggler’s
views.  But the fact that a baleful public gaze continues to be cast in
the direction of the magnifying effects of combining lawsuits is a
reminder that these issues will likely remain central for some time.
The other contributions to this issue will inform the handling of those
issues in a more positive way.  In another twenty years, however, we
will probably still be confronting the consolidation conundrum.  It is,
in that sense, something of a full-employment act for law professors.
157 David Segal, A Rising Tide Against Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/your-money/class-actions-face-hurdle-in-2011-
supreme-court-ruling.html?_r=0.
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